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南昌市公益林保护条例

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南昌市公益林保护条例

江西省南昌市人大常委会


南昌市公益林保护条例
南昌市人民代表大会常务委员会


(2000年11月10日南昌市第十一届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十六次会议通过 2000年12月23日江西省第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十次会议批准 2001年1月9日)

第一章 总则
第一条 为了保护和培育公益林资源,发挥森林蓄水保土、调节气候、改善环境的作用,适应国民经济和社会发展的需要,根据《中华人民共和国森林法》及其实施条例和其他有关法律、法规的规定,结合本市实际,制定本条例。
第二条 本条例所称公益林包括防护林和特种用途林。
防护林是指以防护为主要目的的森林、林木和灌木丛,包括水源涵养林,水土保持林,防风固沙林,农田、牧场防护林,护岸林,护路林。
特种用途林是指以国防、环境保护、科学实验等为主要目的的森林和林木,包括国防林、实验林、母树林、环境保护林、风景林,名胜古迹和革命纪念地的林木,自然保护区的森林。
第三条 本市行政区域内公益林的规划、营造、抚育、保护和管理,适用本条例。
本市城市规划区内公益林的保护,按照《南昌市城市绿化管理规定》执行。
第四条 各级人民政府应当把公益林保护工作纳入国民经济和社会发展计划,加强对公益林保护工作的领导。
第五条 市人民政府林业主管部门(以下简称市林业主管部门)主管全市公益林保护工作。县、区人民政府林业主管部门(以下简称县、区林业主管部门)主管本行政区域内公益林保护工作。
铁路、公路管理部门以及规划、计划、水利、园林、绿化、环保、公安、乡镇企业等行政管理部门按照各自的职责,做好公益林保护工作。
第六条 公益林经营者应当负责所经营的公益林的保护,落实管护措施。
第七条 公益林的保护应当以发挥生态效益和社会效益为主,实行营造、抚育、保护和管理相结合的原则。
第八条 任何单位和个人都有保护公益林的义务。
第九条 在公益林的保护工作中作出显著成绩的单位和个人,由县级以上人民政府或者有关部门给予表彰奖励。

第二章 规划
第十条 市以及县、区人民政府应当编制公益林保护长远规划,确定保护范围和目标。
公益林保护长远规划,应当与土地利用总体规划、环境保护规划、水土保持规划、城市规划、村庄和集镇规划相协调。
第十一条 市公益林保护长远规划,由市林业主管部门会同有关部门编制,报市人民政府批准。
县、区公益林保护长远规划,由县、区林业主管部门会同有关部门根据市公益林保护长远规划编制,报本级人民政府批准,并报市林业主管部门备案。
第十二条 公益林划分为重点公益林和一般公益林。全市重点公益林的面积应当不少于全市森林总面积的40%。
重点公益林和一般公益林按照国家或者省有关规定划分。重点公益林由市人民政府依法报经国务院或者省人民政府批准,一般公益林由县、区人民政府报市人民政府批准。
第十三条 市林业主管部门应当根据本市公益林保护长远规划编制实施方案,报市人民政府批准后组织实施。
县、区林业主管部门应当根据本县、区公益林保护长远规划和市公益林保护长远规划的实施方案,制定本县、区公益林保护长远规划的实施方案,报市林业主管部门批准后组织实施。
乡、镇人民政府应当根据本县、区公益林保护长远规划及其实施方案,编制实施计划,报县、区林业主管部门批准后组织实施。
第十四条 经批准的公益林保护长远规划和实施方案,任何单位和个人不得擅自变更。确需变更的,应当按照原审批程序报经批准。

第三章 保护
第十五条 市人民政府应当对批准划定的公益林登记造册,对其中市直属的公益林由市林业主管部门建立档案设立保护标志,以制作图案,并予以公示。
县、区人民政府应当对批准划定的所属公益林登记造册,并由县、区林业主管部门设立保护标志,以制作图表,并予以公示。
禁止擅自移动和损坏公益林保护标志。
第十六条 各级人民政府应当组织有关部门建立护林组织,根据实际需要增加护林设施,划定护林责任区,监督公益林基层单位组织群众护林。
第十七条 公益林经营者应当订立护林公约,组织群众护林,划定护林责任区,配备专职或者兼职护林员,制止破坏公益林资源的行为。
第十八条 自然保护区、名胜古迹、革命纪念地的公益林和古树名木,禁止任何形式的采伐。
上款规定以外的公益林可以依法进行抚育和更新性质的采伐。
第十九条 禁止在公益林保护范围内开垦、采石、采砂、采土、烧炭和违反操作技术规程采种、采脂、挖笋、掘根、剥树皮以及过度修枝等毁坏公益林的行为。
第十八条第一款规定范围内还禁止砍柴、放牧、割草、劈枝、采集野生植物、狩猎。
第二十条 公益林保护范围内的宜林荒山、荒地、沙化地和采伐迹地、火烧迹地,由各级人民政府组织植树造林和封山育林(草)。
第二十一条 公益林保护范围内的成、过熟针叶纯林和郁闭度0.2以下的疏残林地,应当进行更新改造或者补植,使之成为阔叶林或者针阔混交林。更新改造的择伐强度不得超过30%。
公益林保护范围内郁闭度0.7以上的人工中幼林,应当进行抚育间伐,间伐后的郁闭度不得低于0.6。
第二十二条 鼓励公益林保护范围内的居民、单位以电、煤、气等能源代替烧柴,实行改灶节柴,推广使用沼气。
第二十三条 各级人民政府应当鼓励、引导公益林保护范围内的公益林经营者按照公益林保护长远规划,因地制宜开展种植、养殖和森林旅游等多种经营活动。
第二十四条 依法保护公益林经营者的合法权益。对公益林经营者因不能采伐利用林木而受到的直接经济损失,应当给予相应的经济补偿。补偿经费由市以及县、区人民政府列入财政预算,予以保证。
国家和省划定的重点公益林的经济补偿,按照国家和省有关规定执行。

第四章 管理监督
第二十五条 公益林保护应当纳入各级人民政府任期目标管理,实行行政首长负责制。
上级人民政府应当对下级人民政府公益林保护长远规划实施情况进行监督检查。
第二十六条 公益林保护实行监察制度。
市林业主管部门可以根据需要派出监察组对县、区公益林保护工作进行监督检查。
第二十七条 林业主管部门应当依法对公益林资源的保护、管理和更新进行监测,定期观察记载,建立资源档案,并将监测情况报同级人民政府和上级林业主管部门。
第二十八条 对公益林进行抚育或者更新性质的采伐,应当制定采伐方案,方案中必须有水土保持的内容,并报县级以上林业主管部门或者有关管理部门按照管理权限审批。林业主管部门批准采伐方案后,应当将采伐方案抄送水行政主管部门。县级以上林业主管部门或者有关管理部门
应当在上级下达的年采伐限额内审批。
林业主管部门或者有关管理部门应当加强对抚育或者更新性质采伐的监督检查。
第二十九条 在重点公益林保护范围内禁止设立木材加工厂或者木材交易市场,禁止以木材为原料养食用菌,禁止烧木炭。一般公益林保护范围内设立木材加工厂或者木材交易市场,必须经县级以上林业主管部门批准。
第三十条 未经林业主管部门同意,任何单位和个人不得改变公益林林地用途。
因勘查、开采矿藏或者其他建设工程,确需征用、占用公益林林地的,用地单位应当报经林业主管部门审核同意并缴纳森林植被恢复费后,再依法办理建设用地审批手续;确需采伐已批准征用、占用的公益林林地上的林木时,应当依法取得采伐许可证。
因勘查、开采矿藏或者其他建设工程确需临时占用公益林林地的,按前款规定的审核批准程序办理。临时占用期满后,应当及时恢复。
第三十一条 因征用、占用公益林林地而减少的公益林面积,由林业主管部门依照有关规定用所收取的森林植被恢复费安排异地植树造林予以恢复。异地植树造林的面积不得少于因征用、占用而减少的公益林面积。
第三十二条 各级人民政府和有关部门应当加大对公益林保护的投入,将公益林保护所需经费列入预算。
公益林保护经费应当专款专用,任何单位和个人不得挪用、截留,审计部门应当定期进行审计监督。

第五章 法律责任
第三十三条 违反本条例规定,盗伐公益林的,依法赔偿损失;责令补种盗伐株数10倍的树木,没收盗伐的林木或者变卖所得,并处盗伐林木价值5倍以上10倍以下的罚款。
第三十四条 违反本条例规定,滥伐公益林的,责令补种滥伐株数5倍的树木,并处滥伐林木价值3倍以上5倍以下的罚款。
第三十五条 违反本条例规定,在公益林保护范围内开垦、采石、采砂、采土、烧炭或者违反操作技术规程采种、采脂、挖笋、掘根、剥树皮以及过度修枝等,致使公益林受到毁坏的,依法赔偿损失,责令停止违法行为,补种毁坏株数3倍的树木,可以处毁坏林木价值3倍以上5倍以
下的罚款。
第三十六条 违反本条例规定,在自然保护区、名胜古迹、革命纪念地、沙化地区、水土流失区、险坡地段的公益林内砍柴、放牧致使公益林受到毁坏的,依法赔偿损失,责令停止违法行为,补种毁坏株数3倍的树木。
第三十七条 对本条例第三十三条至第三十六条责令补种而拒不补种或者补种不符合国家有关规定的,由林业主管部门或者有关管理部门安排代为补种,所需费用由违法者支付。
第三十八条 违反本条例规定,林业主管部门或者有关管理部门对因征用、占用公益林林地而减少的公益面积未予以安排恢复或者违反第三十七条规定拒不安排代为补种的,对其直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员,由其上级主管机关或者其所在单位给予行政处分。
第三十九条 违反本条例规定,未经县级以上林业主管部门批准,擅自在公益林保护范围内设立木材加工厂或者木材交易市场的,责令改正,没收非法经营的木材和违法所得,并处违法所得2倍以下的罚款。
第四十条 违反本条例规定,擅自改变公益林林地用途的,责令限期恢复原状,并处非法改变用途林地每平方米20元以上至30元以下的罚款。
临时占用公益林林地逾期未及时恢复的,依照前款规定处罚。
第四十一条 违反本条例规定,擅自移动或者损坏公益林保护标志的,责令限期恢复原状;逾期不恢复原状的,由林业主管部门代为恢复,所需费用由违法者支付。
第四十二条 本条例规定的行政处罚,由县级以上林业主管部门实施,其中第三十三条至第三十六条可以由县级以上林业主管部门依法委托林业公安机关实施。法律、法规规定由其他有关部门实施的,依照有关法律、法规的规定执行。
第四十三条 违反本条例规定的其他行为,由有关管理部门依法予以处罚。
第四十四条 违反本条例规定的行为构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。
第四十五条 林业主管部门和其他有关管理部门的工作人员滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊的,由其所在单位或者上级主管机关给予行政处分;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。

第六章 附则
第四十六条 本条例具体应用中的问题,由市林业主管部门负责解释。
第四十七条 本条例自2001年6月1日起施行。



2001年1月9日
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武汉市人民政府关于废止《武汉市网吧管理暂行办法》的决定

湖北省武汉市人民政府


武汉市人民政府关于废止《武汉市网吧管理暂行办法》的决定


(2003年5月26日武汉市人民政府第6次常务会议审议通过 2003年6月5日武汉市人民政府令第144号公布)



经2003年5月26日市人民政府第六次常务会议研究,决定废止2000年8月19日市人民政府发布的《武汉市网吧管理暂行办法》(武汉市人民政府令第119号)。





Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement(to be discussed in subsequent chapter).6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11

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